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of the current approach and suggests an alternative 
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The efforts to launch the Global Negotiations on international 
economic issues, planned to be held at the United Nations, have 
been stalemated ever since the UN General Assembly resolved at 
its Thirty-Fourth Session in 1979 to launch them in 1980 at a 
special session. The frustration of the developing countries ("the 
South") over this stalled situation and their perception that the 
developed countries ("the North") are being inflexible have in-
jected a discordant note into the so-called North-South dialogue, 
a process that may be traced back at least to the first United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) in 
1964. As attempts are being made again to seek a successful 
launching of the negotiations, it is important to assess their un-
derlying objectives and to question whether the Global Negotia-
tions are the ideal, or possibly even a feasible, way of achieving 
these objectives. 
Historical perspective 
The North-South dialogue, in some form or another, has been 
on the international scene for a long time. It is, however, difficult 
to understand the present state of the negotiations and their pros-
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pects without appreciating the key role played by oil. In particu-
lar, it must be recognized that the emergence of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a major actor on the 
world economic scene has transformed North-South issues. With-
out going into a history of postwar economic relations, a brief 
sketch of the major phases in the evolution of these relations will 
serve to put the North-South dialogue, and more specifically the 
Global Negotiations, in a proper context. For the purposes of this 
analysis, postwar international economic relations may be con-
veniently divided into five identifiable phases. 
First, the period from the end of the war until 1973 may be 
termed the era of the Liberal International Economic Order. Un-
der the leadership of the United States, the international institu-
tions founded at the end of the war or soon thereafter-namely, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
GATT-provided the institutional umbrella under which trade, 
investment, and growth prospered. But while this period was one 
of unprecedented growth in world trade as well as rapid develop-
ment for many countries, the seeds of later disputes were already 
sprouting. Two in particular may be noted. First, even though all 
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countries stood to gain from the working of the institutions men-
tioned above, there was a feeling among a number of developing 
countries-namely, those that had not achieved political sover-
eignty at the time the international institutions were created-that 
these agencies were not structured in such a way as to address 
their particular needs. In addition, the emphasis on liberal trade 
and payments that characterized the Liberal International Eco-
nomic Order, in particular in matters dealing with the classical 
choice between protection and trade, was not fully shared by 
many of the newly independent countries. 
Up to 1973, these differences in approach were still manage-
able, and indeed the specialized agencies had been modified to 
accommodate some of the concerns of developing countries-
Part IV had been introduced into the GATT in 1964 clearing the 
way for the granting of preferences to exports of developing coun-
tries; in 1963, the compensatory financing facility and in 1969 the 
buffer stock facility were created in the Fund; and at the World 
Bank, the International Finance Corporation was established in 
1956 and the International Development Association in 1960. 
The second phase, covering 1973-76, was characterized by the 
emergence of Southern solidarity and "militancy." The interna-
tional economic system that had evolved during the postwar 
period was sharply disrupted by the success of OPEC in effecting 
a fourfold increase in oil prices including the embargo by some of 
its members. One consequence of this was a shift in both the tone 
and content of the North-South dialogue. The success with oil led 
some developing countries, who had always thought of reliance 
on commodity exports as a sign of economic dependence and 
weakness, to consider them instead, via commodity cartels, as a 
potential source of strength-the economic concept of "commod-
ity power" was born. This perception was at least partially shared 
in the North, paving the way for the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation in Paris during 1975-77. The focus on com-
modities went hand in hand with the view that the entire range 
of international economic issues-trade, money, aid, energy, and 
so on-should be negotiated together. In part, this was seen as a 
negotiating ploy on the part of OPEC to prevent energy being 
negotiated in isolation. But it also reflected the view, embodied in 
the New International Economic Order proclaimed at the 1973 
conference of nonaligned countries in Algiers, that the interna-
tional economic management structure had to be reorganized to 
reflect the South's aspirations and interests. 
Phase three (1976-78) was one of adjustment to the oil shock, 
the stabilization of oil prices, and the beginning of energy conser-
vation. Oil was seen to have been a special case and "commodity 
power" was recognized as being illusory. At the same time, the 
North's sense of vulnerability diminished with energy conser-
vation aiding the adjustment process, and the urgency of reach-
ing accommodation with the South faded. The South's solidarity 
was simultaneously eroded, as the successful recycling of the oil 
exporting countries' surpluses to the more developed of the de-
veloping countries meant that the latter were now being more 
fully integrated, and politically coopted, into the international 
economic system. Finally, the success of oil, while whetting the 
South's demands, had also weakened the North's macroeconomic 
situation and hence its political and financial capacity to respond 
to the demands of developing countries for greater resource trans-
fers. The post-1973 Southern militancy therefore lost its rationale. 
The fourth phase (1978-80) was heralded by the cut in oil pro-
duction triggered by the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent 
second major rise in oil prices. This gave a new lease of life to the 
developing country notion of negotiating from strength and led to 
renewed demands that comprehensive Global Negotiations be 
launched on North-South issues. This approach found favor with 
OPEC, hoping to defuse therewith Southern pleas for oil price 
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relief. The UN General Assembly resolved that a round of Global 
Negotiations on international economic issues be launched at a 
special session of the UN in 1980. 
The fifth and final phase (1981-83) is one characterized by the 
global recession and its aftermath. The world recession, accom-
panied by the phenomenal rise in real interest rates, and to a 
lesser extent the success of conservation policies in the North have 
slowed both growth and the demand for imported energy. The 
North has little to gain directly from Global Negotiations: for 
example, there is no quid pro quo to be obtained from OPEC and 
other commodity suppliers in return for major concessions to 
Southern demands. The South, therefore, cannot negotiate from 
strength. Global Negotiations must be examined against this 
background. 
The path ahead 
A major lesson from the current impasse is that it is futile to 
persist with the Global Negotiations at this juncture, if at all. A 
number of fundamental reasons militate against their progress. 
There are deep divisions among the major Northern countries 
and also among the leaders of the South on the question of at-
tempting a global bargain, that is, embracing different sectoral 
issues simultaneously rather than negotiating sectoral questions 
as separate issues. Closely allied to this asymmetry of preferences 
in negotiating strategy is the debate on where the negotiations 
ought to be conducted. The North seeks to negotiate on a sectoral 
basis at the specialized economic agencies, such as the Fund and 
the World Bank, where the voting procedures are weighted and 
hence generally assign a decisive role to the North. The South 
prefers a wider discussion at the United Nations where the one-
nation one-vote principle gives it the advantage. 
If the South then is to abandon, at least temporarily, the hith-
erto unproductive idea of Global Negotiations, it must take posi-
tive initiatives simultaneously to promote its basic objectives and 
impart a forward momentum, however small, to North-South 
relations. Possibilities for such initiatives definitely exist on two 
fronts. 
First, deliberations on the reform of the global economic man-
agement structure over the medium term could be initiated on 
three levels. (1) Changes have already occurred in the major 
global economic institutions, enhancing the role of the developing 
countries. For example, as part of the agreement on the Second 
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, the num-
ber of issues requiring special, high majorities-thus conferring 
on the developing countries voting en bloc a veto power-has been 
increased. Other such changes, which would confer a greater 
voice to the developing countries without sacrificing working effi-
ciency, are feasible and must be systematically explored. (2) At the 
same time, an appropriate and feasible role for the UN in global 
economic management should be devised. A compromise could 
be wrought that would convert the UN into a body where a 
comprehensive review of global problems is undertaken periodi-
cally, while actual decisions on sectoral issues are taken with the 
aid of this review at the specialized agencies. (3) These two 
changes could be supplemented by a serious examination of 
whether the number of existing specialized agencies should be 
expanded to handle the emerging global economic issues. For 
example, the emergence of international migration between the 
North and the South and not merely intra-South and intra-North 
is a major phenomenon and deserves special attention. The frag-
mented and ad hoc emphasis that it receives in different inter-
national agencies, if it receives any at all, points in the direction 
of a Code of Conduct, and indeed a GATT for migration, to define 
a consensus on the economic (and political) rights and obligations 
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of member states with regard to their borders and treatment of 
aliens. 
Second, the current global macroeconomic crisis provides an 
opportunity to move toward a higher level of global economic 
deliberations, embracing both North and South. The worrisome 
world debt situation and its manifold ramifications, which con-
cern several key countries in both groups of nations, have created 
genuinely mutual interests. This crisis paradoxically affords a key 
opportunity because Northern interests are now critically inter-
twined with Southern imperatives through debt: Northern lend-
ers have as great a stake in the viability of their loans as Southern 
borrowers, so that there are now major influential groups in the 
North for whose economic well-being Southern prosperity, and 
hence solvency, is important. 
There exists, therefore, a unique political opportunity to look 
at, and deliberate upon, the broader issues of international fi-
nance and economic cooperation. They include the need,to com-
bat protectionism, thus providing Southern exporters with access 
to Northern markets and making it possible for debt to be repaid, 
and the need to direct augmented aid flows to the many dis-
tressed Southern nations that cannot borrow from the private 
markets. The necessity for joint, multilateral deliberations, keep-
ing broader interactions between different sectoral issues in mind, 
evidently exists. 
An international monetary conference held at ministerial level 
in 1984 could address two related items of immediate concern. 
First, there is a need for an appropriate institutional structure and 
governing principles for debt management for the relatively few 
middle-income developing countries who borrowed heavily dur-
ing the 1970s and who must now reach understandings with their 
creditor Northern banks. The second issue could be how to assist 
the low-income developing countries, many in Africa but others 
elsewhere, who need official assistance and official debt relief, 
especially in view of the collapse of their primary export earnings. 
There are enough mutual interests between banks in the North 
and their middle-income Southern borrowers for such a dialogue 
to be rewarding. The question of the low-income countries has to 
be answered on a rather different plane, much like famine relief. 
While a new world monetary conference could make up for the 
lack of broad participation in the decisions of specialized agencies, 
it could also set an example of how to arrive at a compromise 
between the South's and the North's positions on the respective 
roles of the specialized agencies and the UN as forums for nego-
tiating North-South issues. Such a conference could discuss the 
substance of what ought to be done and try to reach a consensus. 
But this does not rule out the possibility that the ultimate nego-
tiations be conducted at the specialized agencies themselves (un-
less, of course, new institutions emerge from these deliberations, 
which seems unlikely). 
Many of these ideas have now achieved a wide degree of accep-
tance among developing countries. The Global Negotiations have 
been effectively put on the back burner for at least another year 
and the idea of an international economic summit has been em-
braced explicitly by the South. The task awaiting Southern diplo-
macy now is to convert this dramatic shifting of gears into political 
action in order to secure the necessary Northern response. liD 
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